

3 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Review of CIA-DIA Relations with Lt. Gen. Joseph Carroll,
1245-1545, 2 April 1963

1. In setting up this luncheon meeting with General Carroll, I told him there were several major areas of mutual interest which I would like to review with him, and suggested that we do it alone initially in order to reach a basis for discussion before bringing in the working level. He indicated that he thought this would be advisable, and the following summarizes the highlights of a meeting which lasted three hours.

2. In general, I found General Carroll's attitude friendly; he seemed ready and willing to be cooperative, still heavily committed to working out the details of the organization and mission of DIA, and quite sensitive to any indication that his own organization might be in error or engaged in activities outside of its charter. At no time during our discussion did he indicate any hostility towards CIA, and in every instance in which there was any implied criticism of the Agency, he balanced it with a statement to the effect that he understood why the Agency had taken that particular position. While he never put it in so many words, it was quite apparent that he admires the professionalism and work of the Agency--particularly in the clandestine intelligence field and in NPIC. In leaving, he made the rather significant comment that up until this time he had never dared to be away from his desk for any length of time because there were so many matters which he felt required his personal attention.

3. For convenience of use of this memorandum, I have dealt with each subject discussed on a separate page and will distribute these to the appropriate units. Because General Carroll was speaking to me as a friend and in complete confidence, I request that this memorandum be closely held, and that no action be taken on items in it by the working level without prior clearance with me.

DIA review(s) completed.

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Executive Director

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Clandestine Collection

1. I mentioned to General Carroll that we had received his memorandum [redacted] 25X1
He said he thought the time lag in this instance was reprehensive and considered it entirely the fault of Defense. He pointed out that it was over a year since the operation had first been proposed [redacted] and that it 25X1
had only now reached this level for adjudication. He said this was almost completely the fault of the military system whereby this had to go through several command echelons before it was forwarded back to Washington for resolution. He noted that CIA had the procedure whereby the station chiefs immediately forwarded back to Washington any problem in the coordination field, and that our centralized system therefore gave us a greater ability to act more quickly than theirs. He said it was his intention to eventually set up the unified and specified commands as coordination points. We discussed briefly whether there was any value in the CIA officers in these commands having any coordination responsibilities and, interestingly enough, he said he didn't think this would work because our officers in the commands would not have the detailed familiarity with the operations that our station chiefs possessed.

2. I asked him whether he thought there was any weakness in our system in handling these coordination efforts, and he gave me the clear impression that he felt there had to be a lot of housecleaning in DOD before he was ready to find fault with us. He mentioned that many of his own staff had urged him to take over the direction of clandestine operations, but that he had resisted this--feeling that it was better to allow these operations to continue to be run by the individual services, with DIA in a supervisory role. He noted that clandestine operations were almost exclusively those of the Army, with some by the Air Force, and very few by the Navy. He gave me the impression that his objective will be to develop a clandestine effort more parallel to ours, and will attempt to develop the same type of professionalism and continuity of service that we have in our clandestine services. This led into a general discussion of training.

3. General Carroll said there were times when he felt that he would like to be personally briefed on the identification of sources. He noted that CIA's source descriptions were generally excellent, but said that on quite a few occasions he would like to know more about the source, and particularly more about the follow-up that was being undertaken.

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1. I asked his views of the decision that had been reached after a joint study had been made by DOD and our Office of Training to the effect that joint training by CIA and DIA for clandestine operations was impractical. He said that, as he recalled the study, it is now about a year old, the team from Fort Holabird which had done it had concluded that our security requirements would have necessitated compartmentation of the DIA trainees and he felt this was most undesirable and, if required, he would indicate the advisability of separate training. General Carroll said he understood quite well why CIA would want to compartment their clandestine personnel, particularly when the DIA personnel might be temporary or move on to other assignments. He said this was one of the things he was working on in order to get personnel on a career basis, and until he could do this he was in agreement with our position. He then described the paper which he had submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff whereby DIA would have been given the career management of all services personnel assigned to it; he noted that this had evoked a violent reaction on the part of the services and had been sent back to him for reply, which he had done maintaining his position that he could not develop a career intelligence organization without control over the personnel. This had now gone through the JCS again and to the Secretary of Defense for a decision. He said that as an interim measure he might like to assign a few of his qualified senior personnel to take our clandestine training, and asked about the length of the courses. I told him very briefly

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weeks. He noted that in the study on our courses, the observation had been made that certain portions probably were not adaptable to military intelligence training. He went on to comment that there had already been one noticeable improvement as a result of DIA having been given the responsibility for all intelligence training, and this was the fact that the Attaches from all three services now went to the same school and consequently arrived in the field with a much better understanding of each other's responsibilities.

2. General Carroll mentioned that the Army may have to close Fort Holabird and relocate the Intelligence School somewhere else. He raised the question as to whether this might not be a good opportunity to review the whole interrelationship of our training, and possibly to consider whether the training schools might be placed contiguous to each other for greater cooperation.

3. General Carroll commented on his system for selection of personnel and said that he insisted on personally reviewing the files of all civilian personnel that were hired and of every military officer assigned. He said that he refused to accept any but the best, and had received some complaints

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Training (con't)

from the Navy that they were not getting as many officers into DIA as the other services. He said he had told them that when they gave him as highly qualified candidates as the others, they would get as many officers in. He also said the Navy had initially refused to let him see the personnel files, and that he had refused to accept any Navy officers until he saw their files. He commented that he had refused to send any DIA civilians to the Naval War College until he was more certain of their qualifications and permanence, and noted that the present strength of DIA was 1700--many of whom he had acquired as units were transferred from the services.

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1. General Carroll mentioned that I had said one of the things I wanted to talk about was current intelligence; that he had received instructions from Secretary Gilpatric for himself and Horwitz to get together with Cline and myself, and he wondered what the subject was. I told him that the Director and Mr. Gilpatric had had several discussions on the daily Intelligence Bulletins, and that they wanted us to examine the possibility of one daily Bulletin, jointly produced, which would go to all of the common users. He asked whether this stemmed from any criticism of the Defense Intelligence Bulletin, and I said that it was not so much a criticism as a desire to provide the top policy makers with one Bulletin reflecting the views of the whole intelligence community, and would not in any way inhibit DIA from producing the specialized intelligence required by the military services or the commands. I noted that in the space of a month there were a large number of items duplicated in the Defense Intelligence Bulletin and the Central Intelligence Bulletin, and that occasionally different views and interpretations would arise.

2. General Carroll then went into a rather lengthy dissertation on his production center which he is just getting organized, and which he envisages will be an all-source center in which the analysts will work directly with the SIGINT, PI and other specialists, and provide a detailed back up in depth for the intelligence production. He expressed concern about the tendency for raw intelligence reports to go to high policy levels and start actions which were unwarranted, and mentioned [] calling Gen. Taylor as a result of a raw intelligence report which had not been evaluated by the analysts. He said that he felt the same criticism could be directed at NSA,

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3. Carroll pointed out that his entire organization had to be designed to be responsive to DOD and the commands, and would produce all military intelligence including order of battle, except for scientific and technical intelligence, which would still be produced by the services, but which DIA would monitor.

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Current Intelligence (con't)

4. He asked what preparation he should do for discussion with Cline and myself, and I suggested that we had already prepared proposals which we would submit to them and that studies on their part were premature. I suggested we get together next week, and he commented that he had to appear before the House Armed Services Committee on Monday or Tuesday for the DIA building, and Horwitz was still tied up in the TFX inquiry. We left it that I would be in touch with him.

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NPIC

1. I told him that another area I wanted to discuss was the future of NPIC and how the expansion would be handled. He then commented at some length on how, during the Cuban crisis, he had had no PI assets inasmuch as the services controlled them. These personnel have now been transferred to DIA, and Carroll said it is his intention to build up the number of DIA PIs at NPIC to about 165, and to keep 35 to 50 PIs in his own production center where they will be working next to the analysts. He commented that it was unfortunate that the PIs and analysts couldn't all be together and that even a separation of four or five miles was difficult. He noted that on many occasions during the Cuban crisis the intelligence community was put in a position of depending exclusively upon the PIs without the analysts having a chance to comment on the interpretation. He noted the excellent work of GMAIC and JAEIC during the crisis.

2. After extolling both the fine work of Lundahl and NPIC, he voiced four criticisms which he felt reflected problems that had come up during the Cuban crisis which he hoped could be avoided in the future.

(1) He was required to brief the Joint Chiefs, the Chairman of JCS and the Secretary of Defense each morning at hours when the daily NPIC product had not yet reached him. He said that as a result of this he started to make his own boards and Lundahl called him and asked to put the NPIC name on them, to which he agreed. But he pointed out that he still was not getting the support that he needed for these morning briefings.

(2) He worked out an arrangement with Lundahl to send ten PIs to NAVPIC. For some reason this was turned down in CIA, and the people did not show up, but he had not been consulted on the turn-down. He finally got it straightened out and the people assigned, but felt the method of handling was a little sloppy.

(3) He felt very strongly that some of the inhibitions and restrictions on dissemination of information had blighted the comments, and pointed out that he had to take it on his own responsibility to send the material on offensive missiles. He noted that if he had not been doing this, General Sweeney would not have had the material to work with at a time when he had been told by the President that he might have to attack the next day.

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NPIC

(4) He commented on the fact that NPIC had gone from a 24-hour a day basis to an 8-hour a day basis without consultation with him and at a time when he had commitments to supply the commands. He felt, again, that there should have been consultation with him personally on this.

3. We then discussed the long-term plan of the expansion of NPIC to about double its present size, and it was apparent that he plans to utilize it to the fullest for DIA, but at the same time keeping PIs in his production center to work next to the analysts.

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